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COMMENTS
privilege, and at the same time the requirement of unanimity could
be considered as an imperative requirement.
The issue of the relinquishment of the unanimity requirement should
be resolved by reference to the underlying social policies. It could be
argued that most defendants cannot properly evaluate the protection
afforded by the unanimity requirement and consequently could not
make an intelligent waiver. It could also be argued that the unanimity
requirement is closely allied with the requirement of proof of guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and that if waiver were allowed an accused
could be convicted even though some of the triers of fact were not
convinced of his guilt. It could also be said that to allow an accused
to wager his freedom on his guess as to which way the jury was split
would introduce into criminal trials a singularly inappropriate element
of chance.
The result reached by the court in the principal case is supported
by the fact that a provision for waiver of unanimity was considered
but not included in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It may
be, however, that the history of the unanimity provision does not re-
solve the issue; the failure to include a provision for waiver does not
necessarily require an implication of an intent to prohibit waiver.
The rights guaranteed by the Constitution are intended for the
protection of the accused. If the accused in a prosecution intelligently
decides that his interests will be advanced by discarding some of his
Constitutional protections, he should be allowed to do so. He is in a
much better position to weigh the various factors of his particular case
than is a legislator formulating abstract rules to cover all cases. It is
submitted that the result reached by the court in the principal case is
incorrect, and that the requirement of unanimity, like the other Con-
stitutional protections, should be subject to waiver.
EVIDENCE--EXPERT OPINION ON ULTIMATE FACTS
Hooper -v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 549 (Utah 1952)
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover
damages for injuries sustained when her truck overturned due to a
separation of the rear wheel. An expert witness for the defendant was
asked what caused the separation. The plaintiff's objection to the
question on the ground that it called for opinion testimony on the
ultimate fact in issue was overruled. The Utah Supreme Court, affirm-
ing the ruling of the trial court, said that an expert witness may ex-
press an opinion as to the cause of any particular condition or occur-
rence, and may do so with any degree of positiveness he deems neces-
sary.'
I. Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 260 P.2d 549 (Utah 1953). (Reversed on
other grounds.)
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As a very general rule, a witness must testify only to facts as per-
ceived by him, and inferences drawn from those facts are opinion and
inadmissible as evidence.2 The reasons given for the exclusion of
opinion are that such testimony is superfluous and consumes unneces-
sary time, and that it may have undue influence upon the jury.3 The
courts have recognized an exception to the general rule and have al-
lowed expert witnesses to testify as to their opinion when the subject
matter of the controversy is outside the scope of ordinary knowledge;
the jury, in such a case, would be unable to render an intelligent ver-
dict without the aid and opinion of an expert witness.4 In applying
this exception many courts have assumed, as an inflexible rule of law,
that an expert may render an opinion as to secondary and evidentiary
facts, but he may not utter an opinion touching upon the ultimate fact
in issue before the jury.5 The proponents of this rule, the historical
majority of courts, have invariably uttered the platitudinous phrase
that such testimony upon the ultimate fact invades the province of the
jury. An explanation sometimes given for the rule is that the expert
should not be permitted to go beyond stating the causes that "could"
result in a certain condition, because the question of whether or not it
"did" is one of controversy and not within the scope of expert opinion7
2. 7 WIG Iopx, EvIDENcE § 1917 (3d ed. 1940).
3. 7 id. § 1918; WIOMORE, Coi OF THE RULrS OF EvmENcE IN TRIALs AT LAW,
Rule 100, Art. 2, § 758 (1942).
4. 7 WIGuORs, EVIDENCE § 1917 (3d ed. 1940); Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5
VAND. L. Rzv. 414, 416 (1952).
5. Carter v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. App. 2d "524, 154 P.2d 907 (1945);
Keefe v. Armour & Co., 258 Ill. 28, 101 N.E. 252 (1913); In re Harris' Estate,
247 Mich. 690, 226 N.W. 661 (1929); Roberts v. New York Elevated Ry., 128
N.Y. 455, 28 N.E. 486 (1891).
6. Carter v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. App. 2d 524, 528, 154 P.2d 907, 909(1945) ; Morton's Admr v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 282 Ky. 174,
177, 138 S.W.2d 345 (1940); DeGroot v. Winter, 261 Mich. 660, 671, 247 N.W.
69 (1933). Cf. Patrick v. Treadwell, 222 N.C. 1, 4, 21 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1942).
In the case of In re Harris' Estate, 247 Mich. 690, 226 N.W. 661 (1929), the
court expressed some suspicion in regard to expert testimony, saying:
The rule permitting experts, usually employed and paid to express desired
opinions, has gone far enough. It should not now be extended so as to per-
mit such experts to substitute their conclusions for those of the jury.
Id. at 696, 226 N.W. at 663.
7. Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chicago City Ry., 272 Ill. 71, 111 N.E. 499 (1916);
DeGroot v. Winter, 261 Mich. 660, 247 N.W. 69 (1933); Patrick v. Treadwell,
222 N.C. 1. 21 S.E.2d 818 (1942).
In the DeGroot case Justice Wiest differentiated between testifying as to cause
and testifying as to a condition, saying that an expert could give his opinion as
to the comnetency and sanity of an individual because that is testimony as to a
"condition," not a "cause." There was a strong dissent in the case.
In Hurwit v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 45 Cal. App. 2d 74, 113 P.2d 691(1941), and Weaver v. Shell Co. of California, 34 Cal. App. 2d 713, 94 P.2d 364(1939), the court, recognizing the binding jurisdictional precedent excluding
opinion evidence touching upon the ultimate fact, refused to reverse the lower
court ruling admitting such testimony because there was no showing of prejudice
to the appellant.
Missouri. which generally allows expert opinion as to the ultimate fact (Scanlon
v. Kansas City, 336 Mo. 1058, 81 S.W.2d 939 (1935)) does not allow direct opinion
evidence as to testamentary capacity on the theory that it invades the jury's
province (Rothwell v. Love, 241 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. 1951) ; Baptiste v. Boatman's
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The more recent rule is that an expert may testify as to the ultimate
fact in issue.2 Courts favoring the admissibility of expert opinion on
the precise issue before the jury tenaciously hold that such testimony
does not invade the province of the jury because it is only opinion and
can be accepted or rejected by them in whole or in part-' It is further
felt that, since expert opinion is admissible notwithstanding the opin-
ion rule, it should be treated as factual testimony and therefore should
always be admissible regardless of its relationship to the ultimate fact
in issue.o Adhering to this broader rule, courts feel that the expert
should be allowed to give his honest belief with any degree of positive-
ness which he feels justified, so that the jury can reap the benefit of an
unequivocal opinion of the expert as to a matter with which he is
fully informed.,,
To allow opinion testimony only on evidentiary facts and exclude
it on the ultimate facts apparently makes evidence admissible when
it is of little relevancy and inadmissible when it is at its peak of proba-
tive value. In effect, this makes irrelevancy the ground for admission
and relevancy the ground for exclusion.'12 The modern trend seeks to
aid the jury in every possible way in arriving at an intelligent finding
by utilizing the exception to the opinion rule in its broadest applica-
tion. The court in the principal case, in following this modern trend,
undoubtedly reached a sound decision.
National Bank of St. Louis, 148 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1941)). Perhaps the reasonfor the exclusion of such testimony on questions of testamentary capacity is that
it involves a legal standard rather than a mere question of fact. Cf., Express
Pub. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 143 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1944) ;
Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 361, 5 N.W.2d 646, 663(1942); Cole v. Uhlmann Granin Co., 340 Mo. 277, 297, 100 S.W.2d 311, 332(1937). In both the Baptiste and Rothwell cases, supra, the court cites the con-
curring opinion in Heinbach v. Heinbach, 247 Mo. 301, 202 S.W. 1123 (1918) as
authority for holding that an expert cannot testify as to the competency of a
testator; however the majority opinion in the Heinbach case held that a lay
witness should not give his opinion as to testamentary capacity. The importantdistinction is that lay witnesses. in will cases, are allowed to testify as to opinion
only when based upon personally perceived facts, while an expert can give an
opinion in answer to a hypothetical question.
8. Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942);
Scanlon v. Kansas City, 336 Mo. 1088, 81 S.W.2d 939 (1935) (see note 7 supra);
Tullis v. Rankin, 6 N.D. 44, 68 N.W. 187 (1896); 7 WxoMoiE, EVzhENC § 1920(8d ed. 1940).
9. Ibid. An analogy is mentioned in the Tullis case. An expert by the rule of
that court can express an opinion on the cause of a condition whether numerous
factors could have caused the condition or only one could have caused it. The
type of evidence in each case is the same; the jury is left to determine the weight
of the evidence. Similarly, whether the expert testifies to the evidentiary facts or
to the ultimate fact, the testimony is of the same type, and the jury still determines
the weight to be accorded the evidence. Tullis v. Rankin, 6 N.D. 44, 45, 68 N.W.
187, 188 (1896).
10. Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942).
See 7 WIqMOPn, EVwDEncE 1920 (3d ed. 1940).
11. Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942);
Scanlon v. Kansas City, 336 Mo. 1058. 81 S.W.2d 939 (1935).12. Cropper v. Titanium Pigment Co., Inc., 47 F.2d 1038, 1043 (8th Cir. 1931);
Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 347 5 N.W.2d 646, 657(1942) citing 11 R.C.L. 583 (1916).
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